

Trading Activity in Commodity Futures and Options Markets ^{*}

Tianyang Zhang [†]

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Abstract

Little is known about trading activity in commodity options market. We study the information content of commodity futures and options trading volume. Time-series tests indicate that futures contracts in a portfolio with the lowest option-to-futures volume ratio (O/F) outperform those in a portfolio with the highest ratio by 0.3% per week. Cross-sectional tests show that O/F has higher predictive power for futures returns than such traditional risk factors as the carry, momentum, and liquidity factors. O/F has longer predictive horizon for post-announcement returns than the information contained in the monthly World Agricultural Supply and Demand Estimates (WASDE) reports. The analysis of the weekly Commitments of Traders (COT) reports indicates that commercials (hedgers) provide liquidity to non-commercials (speculators) in short-term in commodity options market.

JEL Codes: G12, Q13

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[†]Ph.D. Candidate, Department of Economics, Iowa State University, 275 Heady Hall, 518 Farm House Lane, Ames, Iowa 50011-1054. Email: tianyang@iastate.edu. Website: <https://tianyang-zhang.weebly.com>. Phone: +1(515)708-1123.

1 Introduction

According to [Keynes \(1930\)](#), the commodity futures market was previously treated as a traditional market, where commodity producers short hedged to lock in revenue, and speculative investors sought to make a profit and receive a risk premium for providing insurance to commodity producers. However, the market has fundamentally changed recently due to the phenomenon of “financialization” ([Tang and Xiong, 2012](#)). Commodity futures have become popular among financial investors and inflows into the futures market have increased from an estimated \$15 billion in 2003 to at least \$200 billion in mid-2008 ([Tang and Xiong, 2012](#)). A large fraction of this growing inflow of investments is attributed to institutional investors, who did not participate in commodity futures trading previously ([Domanski and Heath, 2007](#)).

Speculation in commodity markets is traditionally defined as trading in excess of what would be required to satisfy hedging demand. Based on this definition, many academic studies split market participants into “hedgers” and “speculators”. The trading by hedgers is then treated as hedging and trading by speculators as speculation. The research on the role of speculators is pioneered by [Working \(1960\)](#), who creates Working’s speculation index, a ratio of the position held by speculators to that of hedgers. When speculation is excessive, the value or volatility of the index is typically high. The theory underlying the speculation index assumes that the level of hedgers’ positions is determined by exogenous hedging demand, while the speculation index itself is mainly driven by trading by speculators.

However, commercial hedgers have recently had other motives to trade. The volatility of commercial hedgers’ positions is quite high and much larger than the volatility of output and revisions to the output forecasts ([Cheng et al., 2014](#)). In fact, price changes have a higher explanatory power compared to changes in the output forecasts when explaining the short-term changes in hedgers’ positions. [Kang et al. \(2017\)](#) analyze weekly COT data and find that hedgers tend to sell commodities when prices are high and buy back when prices are low. Commercial hedgers may attempt to use their informational advantages over speculators by

trading against the latter. For instance, commercial firms might have better knowledge of local physical market conditions. In general, hedgers need not trade only to hedge risks for their business.

In commodity markets, risk sharing is critical, but the boundary between speculation and hedging is occasionally blurred. If commercial hedgers are involved in trading to earn profits, their actions can resemble speculation. Thus, instead of classifying traders as commercial and non-commercial investors, we will focus on trading activities of informed investors.

Commodity market participants face severe information frictions (Socin and Xiong, 2015). In particular, they are exposed to information frictions from the global supply, demand, and inventory of commodities. In a commodity market, information risk arises due to an asymmetry between informed and uninformed investors. Easley et al. (2002) argue that the information structure affects equilibrium asset returns because investors demand compensation for bearing the risk of information-based trading.

This paper focuses on informed trading in commodity futures and commodity options markets. To date, there has been much research into commodity futures markets such as Goldstein and Yang (2017) and Kang et al. (2017). However, commodity options markets have received much less attention.

A commodity options contract is written with a particular futures contract as the underlying security. One important difference between commodity options and equity options is that a commodity option is a derivative security of a derivative for a physical commodity. As the popularity of commodity markets increases among investors, equity options traders migrate to commodity options. We are specifically interested in the information content of trading volumes of commodity futures and options contracts. Trading volumes are important in financial markets because order imbalances can reflect private information.

We make four main contributions to the literature. First, we analyze the role of information risk in commodity markets. In the existing literature, the effect of informed trading in commodity futures market has been analyzed using theoretical models only (Goldstein and

Yang, 2017; Sockin and Xiong, 2015). To the best of our knowledge, we are the first to use commodity *options* to analyze the effect of information risk on commodity futures markets empirically. We find that a significant negative relationship between the options-to-futures volume ratio (O/F) and expected returns on commodity markets. Previous studies have focused on the theory of storage, normal backwardation theory, hedging pressure hypothesis, and momentum strategy to analyze expected returns. Our paper provides an alternative, and new approach, which is based on the information risk, to analyze expected returns in commodity markets.

Second, we extend the growing literature on options contracts by considering commodity options. Examples of option and stocks in equity markets are Roll et al. (2010), Johnson and So (2012), An et al. (2014), Hu (2014), Ge et al. (2016), Stilger et al. (2016), Johnson and So (2017), Chan et al. (2015), Cremers and Weinbaum (2010), and Kacperczyk and Pagnotta (2018), among others.

Third, our study confirms WASDE announcement effect. The surprise of forecast in ending stocks can predict post-announcement returns in short-term. O/F has relatively long-lived predictive power comparing with the predictive ability of the information contained in WASDE report. It takes several weeks for the information in O/F fully reflected in futures prices.

Fourth, our paper answers the question about who provide the short-term liquidity in commodity options markets. The non-commercials demand for liquidity and commercials are compensated by providing liquidity on the short-term horizon.

The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. In section 2, we discuss the phenomenon of “financialization” and review the literature. Section 3 provides an empirical analysis, which includes time-series and cross-sectional tests. Section 4 presents additional evidence and discuss that the ability of O/F to predict post-WASDE announcement returns. Section 5 presents the findings of an analysis of COT report. Section 6 contains robustness checks. Section 7 concludes.

2 Related literature

2.1 Commodity financialization

In recent decades, the commodity index traders have become a significant big player in the commodity futures market. One significant effect of commodity financialization is that the longstanding hedging pressure theory have been mitigated and it improves risk sharing in commodity futures market (Tang and Xiong, 2012). The limits of financial investors to financial arbitrage can generate limits to hedging by producers. Hence, the risks from other financial markets affect equilibrium commodity supply and prices (Acharya et al., 2013). The participation of financial institutions leads to a change in the allocation of risk, so that the hedgers hold more risk than before (Cheng et al., 2014).

Commodity financialization may also influence the microstructure of information in futures markets. The information frictions and speculative activity from investor flows may affect the expected returns of commodity futures and result in price booms and busts (Singleton, 2013). Sockin and Xiong (2015) highlight the feedback effects of informational noise on commodity demand and spot prices. The key information friction after financialization is that producers cannot differentiate between the reasons that cause the movement of futures prices, namely financial investors trading versus changes in global economic fundamentals. Goldstein and Yang (2017) emphasize that price informativeness in the futures market can either increase or decrease with commodity financialization. However, financialization can generally improve market liquidity in the futures market and the commodity-equity market comovement goes up. Some papers use theoretical models analyze how commodity financialization affect commodity prices. Basak and Pavlova (2016) build a model including institutional investors entering commodity futures markets. According to their model, all commodity futures prices, volatilities, and correlations go up with financialization. The model from Baker (2014) implies that financialization reduces the futures risk premium, and the correlation between futures open interest and the spot price level increases.

Our paper provides supportive evidence to confirm the financialization in commodity market by comparing futures and options trading volume in figure 2 and figure 3. There is a sharp increase of the futures trading volume since 2005, while the options trading volume has not changed too much. The results are consistent with the findings in the literature that commodity index traders mainly invest in commodity futures markets. Further, the empirical results maintain in before and after the start of the financialization sub-samples in robustness checks in section 6.1.

2.2 Options and their underlying assets

One important measure of information trading in the stock market is the options to stock trading volume ratio (O/S) proposed by Roll et al. (2010). They find O/S is related to many determinants such as delta and trading costs and O/S is higher around earnings announcements. Johnson and So (2012) further examine the information content of option and equity volumes when trade direction is unobserved. The empirical results show that firms in the lowest decile of O/S outperform the highest decile by 0.34% per week. What's more, O/S is a strong signal when short-sale costs are high or option leverage is low. Ge et al. (2016) try to explain why O/S predicts stock returns. Their results indicate that the role of options in providing embedded leverage is the most important channel why options trading predicts stock returns. Another new measure of multimarket information asymmetry (MIA) is created by Johnson and So (2017). The measure is based on the intuition that informed traders are more likely than uninformed traders to generate abnormal volume in options or stock markets.

Many papers study the equity option's characteristics in stock market. Cremers and Weinbaum (2010) find that deviations from put-call parity contain information about future stock returns. They use the difference in implied volatility between pairs of call and put options to measure these deviations. An et al. (2014) show that stocks with large increases in call implied volatilities over the previous month tend to have high future returns, while

stocks with large increases in put implied volatilities over the previous month tend to have low future returns. [Stilger et al. \(2016\)](#) document a positive relationship between the option-implied risk-neutral skewness (RNS) of individual stock returns' distribution and future realized stock returns during the period 1996–2012.

To our knowledge, our paper is the first to use commodity options and the underlying assets commodity futures to analyze the informed trading the commodity markets. Similar with [Roll et al. \(2010\)](#) and [Johnson and So \(2012\)](#), we construct options-to-futures volume ratio O/F , after the time-series and cross-sectional tests, the results show there is a negative and significant relationship between O/F and expected futures return, the results maintain after the robustness checks in section [6.2](#), [6.3](#), and [6.4](#). The analysis of COT reports show that commercials provide liquidity to non-commercials in short-term horizon in commodity options markets

2.3 Asset pricing framework in commodity futures market

The previous literature includes many papers trying to use asset pricing models to price the cross-section of commodity futures. [Jagannathan \(1985\)](#) shows that the consumption-based intertemporal capital asset pricing model (CCAPM) fails to price commodity futures over monthly horizons. [Yang \(2013\)](#) identifies a factor that captures the different return between high and low basis portfolio, which can explain the cross section of commodity futures returns. [Hong and Yogo \(2012\)](#) find that movements in open interest are highly procyclical, correlated with both macroeconomic activity and movements in asset prices. Also, movements in commodity market open interest can predict commodity returns. [Bakshi et al. \(2017\)](#) show that a model that contains an average commodity factor, a carry factor, and a momentum factor is capable of describing the cross-sectional commodity returns. Idiosyncratic volatility is not priced when including commodity specific factors, such as the fundamental backwardation and contango cycle of commodity futures markets ([Miffre et al., 2012](#)). [Basu and Miffre \(2013\)](#) construct a long–short factor mimicking portfolios, and find

that these portfolios are priced in the cross section returns of commodity futures. [Daskalaki et al. \(2014\)](#) explore whether there are common factors in the cross-section of individual commodity futures returns. They test the asset pricing models including the models for equities markets and commodity theory motivated models. The results show that none of the employed factors prices the cross-section of commodity futures. [Szymanowska et al. \(2014\)](#) identify two types of risk premia in commodity futures returns: spot premia related to the risk in the underlying commodity, and term premia related to changes in the basis. The cross-section of spot premia can be explained by the single factor, which is the high-minus-low portfolio sorted by basis. Two additional basis factors are needed to explain the term premia.

In this paper, different from other papers in the literature, we construct the factor options-to-futures volume ratio (O/F) based on the dimension of informed trading. The results show that O/F has better predictive power for futures returns than the commonly used factors such as carry, momentum, and liquidity factors. Our paper makes an unique contribution to the asset pricing framework in commodity futures market.

3 Empirical analysis

3.1 Data and variable definitions

Our main data for this study come from Bloomberg, which contains the individual futures contract for 25 commodities. The data include the comprehensive record of daily futures prices, open interest, volume, call volume, put volume and options implied volatility. We try our best to work with the broadest set of commodities with enough liquidity to be efficiently traded ¹. The sample period of our data is March 1994 to December 2018. We categorize all commodities into four broad sectors: Agriculture, Energy, Livestock, and Metals.

¹For example, we exclude commodities such as Butter, Palladium and Platinum to avoid problems of low liquidity.

Each commodity has many futures contracts with many maturities. Multiple futures contracts trade simultaneously for each commodity that share the features except for the specified delivery period. The price series for contracts with adjacent and near-adjacent maturity date can overlap for a period of time. In this way, the cross-sectional dimension of different futures contracts offers more information than a single futures price series (Smith, 2005).

For each futures contract of each commodity, we restrict data sample according to its options expiration date. The options expiration date is usually in the prior month of the corresponding futures expiration date. We subset the sample from the Tuesday on the week before expiration to 65 calendar days earlier by the option expiration date ². Figure 1 presents the procedure to obtain the selected sample. We eliminate futures contracts with less than one week of data. We also require futures contracts in each week to have at least two observations. The commodity-weeks with 0.3% highest and lowest value of O/F are excluded from the sample to avoid problems of liquidity ³. After imposing these data restrictions, our data sample contains 32555 commodity-weeks corresponding to 1293 calendar weeks and 4283 individual futures contracts.

The option volume for one futures contract in each day is the total volume of option contracts across all strike prices. For the contract with maturity T of commodity i in each week t , we calculate total option and futures volumes. We denote option and futures volumes as $OVOL_{i,t,T}$ and $FVOL_{i,t,T}$. Next, we define the weekly option-to-futures volume ratio as

$$O/F_{i,t,T} = \frac{OVOL_{i,t,T}}{FVOL_{i,t,T}}$$

Similar to Yang (2013) and Gorton et al. (2012), we define the futures excess return as the fully collateralized return of longing a futures contract. At the time of signing a futures contract, the buyer has to deposit enough amount of money that at least equals the present

²We exclude data corresponding to the week of option expiration to avoid the trading volume problem that the investors roll over from the expiring option to the options with the next expiration date.

³The commodity options are overall less liquid than the equity options.

value of the futures contract to eliminate counterparty risk. For commodity i , the futures price with maturity T at time t is denoted as $F_{i,t,T}$. To be consistent with the weekly report of COT about the positions from CFTC, the weekly futures excess return is calculated from the close of markets on Tuesday to the close of markets on Tuesday in the next week as

$$R_{i,t+1,T} = \log\left(\frac{F_{i,t+1,T}}{F_{i,t,T}}\right)$$

When there are trading holidays, we use the futures prices of the nearest day of that trading holiday. The option expiration dates are often in the month preceding the futures contract month. Also, the time of last observation we choose for one contract is the previous Tuesday before the option expiration date. In summary, we don't need to worry about the futures prices that are close to the futures contract maturity because these futures prices are not purely financial, and the commodity has to be delivered after the contract maturity.

Table 1 reports the summary statistics of commodity futures for every individual commodity in the sample. Coffee futures have the highest O/F value, which means the coffee market is the most active in trading options comparing trading futures in our sample. In general, agriculture markets are more active in trading options than energy, livestock, and metals markets.

Table 2 includes the descriptive statistics of $O/F_{i,t,T}$ (hereafter referred to O/F) in each year in our sample. The number of commodities appear in each year is not 25 until year 2006, since the commodity Gasoline enters our sample in year 2006⁴. The total number of contracts of all commodities increases from 139 in year 1994 to 195 in year 2018. The total number of weekly observations of all available commodities also goes up from 988 in year 1995 to 1438 in the year 2018. Figure 2 shows the average annual value of options and futures trading volume between 1994 to 2018. As we see in figure 3, there is a significant decline in the value of O/F after 2006. To address the concern that the phenomenon may be

⁴Beginning October 2005, NYMEX began trading a futures contract for delivery of Reformulated Blendstock for Oxygenate Blending (RBOB).

caused by the introducing Gasoline into data sample in 2006. We present the average annual value of O/F excluding Gasoline futures and options between 1994 and 2018 in figure 4. The phenomenon still exists when excluding Gasoline from data sample. It's an interesting fact since the evidence suggests financialization of commodities starts around the early 2000s and commodities are considered as a new asset class since billions of investment dollars flowed into commodity markets from financial institution, insurance companies, hedge funds and wealth individuals (Tang and Xiong, 2012). We believe the main reason is that the commodity index trader began to hold a larger portion of open interest in commodity futures markets. The index traders don't participate in informed trading, their trading is guided by their trading rules, which are determined and publicly disseminated well prior to the trades being executed (Brunetti and Reiffen, 2014). The sample mean of O/F is 0.220, which means the number of futures contracts traded are around 5 times of options contracts traded. Since there is a high concentration of relative option volume in a small set of commodities, O/F is positively skewed in all the sample sub-periods, which is very similar to the option-to-stock volume ratio in stock market (Johnson and So, 2012).

Table 3 presents the characteristics of groups sorted by O/F for all weekly observations. Group 1 has the lowest value of O/F and group 8 has the highest value of O/F . The groups from 3 to 7 include all of the 25 commodities in the sample. The groups with lower and higher O/F contain fewer number of commodities, but each group has at least 20 kinds of commodities. The commodities distribute evenly in all 8 groups. VLC and VLP indicate the trading volume of call and put contracts of the underlying asset in a given week. For all the groups, the number of call contracts traded is larger than the number of put contracts traded, which indicates that the call contracts are more liquid than the put contracts in the commodity options. This result is consistent with the finding in the equity options (Johnson and So, 2012). In general, higher O/F groups have higher level of option volume except for group 8. The option volume of group 8 is the second highest in all 8 groups and just lower than group 7. For the futures volume, there is no significant difference between the first

7 groups. However, the futures volume in group 8 is much lower than the other 7 groups. The last column r_{t+1} is the weekly average return of one group in the following week after the given week t . As we see in the table, the group 1 with the lowest level of O/F has the highest return in the following week. The group 8 with the highest level of O/F has the lowest return in the following week. Overall, there is a clear trend of declining return from group 1 to group 8, which indicates a negative relationship between relative option trading volume and the return in the following week. One possible reason is that when the informed investors obtain bad news, they prefer to short sale in the commodity option market than in the commodity futures market. Also, when good news happens, the informed investors are more willing to invest in futures than options. This result is also similar with multi-markets of stocks and stock options (Johnson and So, 2012).

Figure 5 provides the scatter plot of the average futures return for individual commodity and the responding value of O/F . From this figure, there is a clear downward trend between the average return and the average value of O/F .

3.2 Time-series tests

The baseline commodity pricing model we use to do time-series tests is from Bakshi et al. (2017). They construct three systematic risk factors and show that the three-factor model is capable of describing commodity futures returns. *AVG* is the average excess return of a long position in all available commodity futures. The commodity carry factor, denoted by *CARRY*, is constructed as the return on a portfolio that is long in the commodities that are most backwardated and short the ones that are most in contango. The momentum factor, denoted by *MOM*, is constructed as the return on a portfolio that is long in the commodities with the highest returns over past 8 weeks and short in the ones with the lowest return over past 8 weeks.

In this paper, we use weekly data instead of monthly data used in Bakshi et al. (2017). At the end of each week, we sort all the commodities of the available futures contracts into

8 groups based on the level O/F . The weekly return for each group is calculated as the equal-weighted return for a portfolio of all commodities in that group in the following week. We compute the weekly return from the close of markets on Tuesday to the close of markets on Tuesday in the next week.

The baseline three-factor asset pricing model of expected return representation for each group $i = 1, 2, \dots, 8$:

$$r_{i,t+1} = \alpha_i + \beta_1 AVG_{i,t+1} + \beta_2 CARRY_{i,t+1} + \beta_3 MOM_{i,t+1} + \epsilon_{i,t+1}$$

implying that the expected excess return are a function of exposure to three factors.

For each commodity, for a given week t , let $F_t^{(0)}$ be the price of front-month futures contract, and let $F_t^{(1)}$ be the price of the next maturity futures contract. We define the weekly basis for commodity i on a given week t as the log difference between the front-month futures price and the next maturity futures price as:

$$B_{i,t} = \log\left(\frac{F_t^{(1)}}{F_t^{(0)}}\right)$$

A commodity is in backwardation if its futures curve is downward sloping (the basis is positive). Otherwise, the commodity is in contango.

To construct *CARRY* factor, we first sort available commodities by basis at the end of week t and split them into 4 portfolios. In the following week $t + 1$, the futures contracts of these commodities are one week closer to their maturities. Then we compute the weekly return of these futures contracts in week $t + 1$. In each portfolio, we use equal weights to compute the average weekly excess return of a portfolio in week $t + 1$. The *CARRY* factor is constructed using the strategy of longing the highest basis portfolio and shorting the lowest basis portfolio.

To construct *MOM* factor, at the end of week t , we focus on equal weights and ranking

of a commodity is determined by a commodity’s past 8 weeks performance:

$$\bar{r}_t = \left(\prod_{j=0}^7 (1 + r_{t-j}) \right)^{\frac{1}{8}} - 1$$

The weekly return of a commodity is calculated as the average weekly return of all available futures contracts for that commodity. We first sort available commodities by past performance at the end of week t and split them into 6 portfolios. In the following week $t + 1$, the futures contracts of these commodities are one week closer to their maturities. Then we compute the average weekly return of these futures contracts in week $t + 1$. In each portfolio, we use equal weights to compute the weekly excess return of a portfolio in week $t + 1$. The *MOM* factor is computed as the strategy of longing the best performance portfolio and shorting the worst performance portfolios.

To construct the *AVG* factor, we aggregate the excess returns of all available futures contracts using equal weights to calculate the average market return for each week t .

Table 4 presents the time-series factor regression for each group using three regressions. The first regression we use is the commodity CAPM, the intercept for each group tends to decrease with O/F . We find that the commodity portfolio with lowest O/F has the highest alpha of 0.001 (t -statistic = 2.732). And the portfolio of commodity with highest O/F has the lowest alpha of -0.001 (t -statistic = -2.275). The “1-8” column takes a statistical test for the difference of lowest between highest portfolios, the results show that there is a positive and significant difference (t -statistic = 3.144). The “(1+2)-(7+8)” takes a statistical test for the difference of two lowest and two highest O/F portfolios, we find that there is a positive and significant difference (t -statistic = 2.244).

The second regression employed is commodity *AVG* and *CARRY*. The third regression contains all the three factors. In these two regressions, the lowest O/F portfolio has the highest statistically significant alpha and the highest O/F portfolio has the lowest statistically significant alpha. For the columns “1-8” and “(1+2)-(7+8)”, the results are similar in

both magnitude and statistical with commodity CAPM.

In summary, with the time-series tests, we find that low O/F can indicate high expected returns. A portfolio of commodities with lowest O/F has significantly positive alpha in the next week after portfolio formation. Also, high O/F indicates low expected returns, as the portfolio of commodities with highest O/F has significantly negative alpha in the next week after portfolio formation.

From table 4, we also find that the strategies of "1-8" and "(1+2)-(7+8)" have a significantly positive loading on the market (AVG) factor. These results indicate that low O/F commodities have more market exposure than high O/F commodities, which is the opposite of the result in stock market that high option to stock volume ratio firm have more market exposure [Johnson and So \(2012\)](#).

3.3 Cross-sectional tests

The cross-sectional tests can be more powerful than traditional time-series tests since the variation in O/F across different commodities at a point in time may be more informative than the variation in O/F .

One potential concern when using the Fama-MacBeth approach is the independence in the time dimension. The average first-order autocorrelation of weekly time-series return of all 25 commodity futures markets is only 0.003. Based on this low autocorrelation of time series returns, we can be confident that the independence in the time dimension is a plausible assumption.

In addition to time-series tests, we also apply the Fama-MacBeth two-stage regression method ([Cochrane, 2009](#)). [Fama and MacBeth \(1973\)](#) suggest a computationally simple procedure for running cross-sectional regressions, and for producing standard errors and test statistics.

The Fama-MacBeth two-stage regression method tests the hypothesis that cross-sectional differences in asset returns are due to cross-sectional differences in asset risk exposure. The

Fama-MacBeth regression has two steps. First, we regress the time-series of the excess return of commodity i on factors to estimate the vector of risk exposure (β_i) as

$$R_{i,t+1} = a_i + \beta_i' f_t + \epsilon_{i,t}, \quad t = 1, 2, \dots, T \quad \text{for each } i$$

where f_t is a set of risk factors. Second, we run the cross-sectional regression at each time period t as

$$R_{i,t+1} = \gamma_t + \beta_i' \lambda_t + \alpha_{i,t}, \quad i = 1, 2, \dots, N \quad \text{for each } t$$

We estimate λ as the average of the cross-sectional regression estimates as

$$\hat{\lambda} = \frac{1}{T} \sum_{t=1}^T \hat{\lambda}_t$$

In the Fama-MacBeth regressions, we include 7 factors to explain the dependent variable $RET(1)$: $\log(O/F)$, CAR , MOM , AMI , $RET(0)$, $\log(FVOL)$, $\log(OPVOL)$.

$RET(1)$ is the dependent variable indicating the return of commodity i in week $t + 1$ after observing O/F at the end of week t .

$\log(O/F)$ is the log value of O/F for commodity i in week t . CAR equals the basis of commodity i at the end of week t . MOM is the cumulative returns measures over the past 8 weeks and adjusted by market return. $RET(0)$ is the contemporaneous return of commodity i in week t . $\log(FVOL)$ and $\log(OPVOL)$ equal the log value of futures and options trading volume of commodity i in week t .

We also include the liquidity factor AMI . According to [Marshall et al. \(2011\)](#), the [Amihud \(2002\)](#) liquidity factor is the best low-frequency liquidity measure for commodity futures. In this paper, we use this measure for the individual futures contract liquidity. The proxy measures absolute price changes per futures contract volume:

$$AMI = \frac{|r_t|}{Volume_t}$$

where r_t is the return on day t and $Volume_t$ is the futures volume on day t .

Estimation results of the Fama-MacBeth regressions are reported in table 5. Column 1 contains the results of regressing $RET(1)$ on CAR and MOM . The coefficient of MOM is positive but not significant. The positive momentum effect doesn't exist in the commodity futures market for weekly data. Also, the CAR coefficient is positive but not significant, indicating that the carry effect is not significant in the commodity market of weekly observations.

Column 2 contains one more factor AMI than column 1. Results show that liquidity does not play an important role in predicting the weekly returns in commodity futures market.

Columns 3 and 4 contain the results of regressing $RET(1)$ on futures volume and options volume after controlling for carry, momentum and liquidity factors. We find that neither futures volume nor options volume are significant in predicting futures returns, although the coefficients of futures volume and options volume are positive and negative.

Column 5 has the result of regressing $RET(1)$ on $\log(O/F)$ after controlling for carry, momentum. The result shows that $\log(O/F)$ is negative and statistically significant at the 5% percent level.

In column 6, we also use liquidity factor besides carry and momentum as the control variable. The variable $\log(O/F)$ is still negative and significant (t -statistics = -2.542).

Finally, in column 7, we include the contemporaneous return in the portfolio formation week, $RET(0)$, to control for the possibility of weekly return reversals. Although the coefficient of $RET(0)$ is positive, this factor is not statistically significant. Also, $\log(O/F)$ is still negatively significant in this regression.

In conclusion, table 5 show that the negative relation between O/F and $RET(1)$ is robust after controlling for the other 4 variables.

4 WASDE announcement analysis

In every month, United States Department of Agriculture (USDA) publishes the monthly WASDE (World Agricultural Supply and Demand Estimates) reports to announce current and expected market conditions for several agricultural commodities to participants in commodity markets. One important forecast from WASDE is the expected ending stock in end of each marketing year. Ending stocks, also referred as carryout, are the amount of a commodity left over after all demand has been satisfied and enters the supply side of the market in the following marketing year. Low ending stocks can lead to high prices of the commodity since it is a signal for less supply of commodity.

In the previous literature, many papers have found the commodity futures react to WASDE announcements. For instance, [Adjemian \(2012\)](#) analyzes the absolute value of overnight return before and after the announcement date and confirms that the WASDE announcement effect persists across contract positions.

This section, however, focuses on a different dimension of WASDE announcement effect. We study the link between the activities in futures and options markets and post-announcement returns. The commodities we analyze in this section are Soybean Oil, Corn, Cotton, Soybeans, Sugar, Soybean Meal, and Wheat.

4.1 Post-announcement returns

Our paper examines the predictive power of O/F for cumulative returns following the announcement. We use four return windows: CUM(+0,+5), CUM(+0,+10), CUM(+0,+15), CUM(+0,+20). CUM(X,Y) equals the cumulative return for each commodity from X trading days to Y trading days after the announcement date.

The forecast of ending stock from the WASDE report for commodity i in month m is defined as $ES_{i,m}$. To capture the news released at the announcement, the surprise of the

forecast in ending stocks comparing with that in the last month is constructed as:

$$\Delta ES_{i,m} = \frac{ES_{i,m} - ES_{i,m-1}}{ES_{i,m-1}}$$

The pre-announcement returns may have a significant effect on the post-announcement returns since the informed traders can obtain private information before the announcement and start to trade in the same direction with the results from the announcement reports. Motivated by this rationale, we construct two more variables: pre-CUM denotes cumulative return over the pre-announcement window (days -5 to -1); abs(pre-CUM) denotes absolute value of cumulative return over the pre-announcement window (days -5 to -1). In the empirical method, the control variables are *CAR* and *AMI* that are the basis and measure for illiquidity for commodity over the pre-announcement window (days -5 to -1). To correct for cross-sectional correlation, the standard errors are clustered (by time), refer to [Petersen \(2009\)](#).

Table 6 presents the results about the predictive power of *O/F* on the cumulative returns after announcement. In the column of CUM(+0,+5), the coefficient on ΔES is significantly negative (*t*-statistic = -4.01). Higher prediction of ending stocks for a commodity *i* is a negative signal for futures price. The reason is that higher ending stocks means the supply is higher than expected, which would cause the futures price going down. After the WASDE report is released, the participants in the commodity market obtain the new information about the predicted ending stocks and change their trading behaviors, which will cause the decrease of futures prices⁵. So the negative relation between the change in forecasts of ending stocks and post-announcement returns is not surprising. However, when the horizon for cumulative returns is longer than CUM(+0,+5) such as CUM(+0,+10), CUM(+0,+15) and CUM(+0,+20), ΔES does not have enough predictive power for cumulative post-announcement returns. So after 5 days post-announcement windows (day 0 to day +5), the information of ending stocks from the WASDE report is not a reliable factor to

⁵See Appendix A for details

predict the futures prices over a long time period. New information will come to investors several days after the WASDE report is released, they will make investment decisions based on the new information, which will affect the predictive power of ΔES .

From table 6, we find that O/F has predictive power over a longer horizon than ΔES does. Consistent with the results in the previous section, the coefficient of O/F is strongly negative (t -statistics = -3.276) in the column of CUM(+0,+5). When the informed traders obtain the private information before the announcement, they will make decisions about investment before the report is released, which cause the significant change in options and futures trading volume. What's more, the coefficients of O/F are significant negative (t -statistics = -3.171, -3.822, -3.778) for other three columns of CUM(+0,+10), CUM(+0,+15), and CUM(+0,+20). Since the trading volume of options and futures in pre-announcement (day -5 to day -1) not only contain the information about the WASDE report, but also include news that is farther away than post-announcement window (day 0 to day +5). So O/F has longer horizon in predictive power than the change of predictions in ending stocks ΔES . The variable pre-CUM is positive and significant (t -statistics = 2.090, 1.814, 1.693) in the columns of CUM(+0,+5), CUM(+0,+10), and CUM(+0,+15). This indicates the momentum effect exists in before and after the announcement. The momentum effect fades away as the time horizon becomes longer.

5 COT report analysis

5.1 Basic information about COT reports

A database commonly used in the studies of commodity market is the weekly Commitments of Traders (COT) reports published by Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC). The COT reports include the aggregate long and short positions of commodity futures market participants by trader type: commercials, non-commercials, and non-reportables. The COT reports provide a breakdown of each Tuesday's open interest for markets in which 20 or

more traders hold positions equal to or above the reporting levels established by the CFTC. The weekly reports for Futures-Only Commitments of Traders and for Futures-and-Options-Combined Commitments of Traders are released every Friday.

For the Futures-and-Options-Combined report, the option open interest and traders' option positions are computed on a futures-equivalent basis using delta factors supplied by the exchanges. Long-call and short-put open interest are converted to long futures-equivalent open interest. Likewise, short-call and long-put open interest are converted to short futures-equivalent open interest. For example, if an investor holds a long call position of 100 contracts with the value of delta being 0.5, this trader is considered to be holding 50 contracts of long futures equivalent positions. A trader's long and short futures-equivalent positions are added to the trader's long and short futures positions to give "combined-long" and "combined-short" positions.

Each individual trader is distinguished by CFTC about whether she has a commercial interest in each commodity. If a trader uses futures contracts in a particular commodity for hedging as defined in CFTC Regulation 1.3, 17 CFR 1.3(z), this trader is classified as commercial. The commercials are often considered to have long positions in the physical product, such as corn producers, trying to reduce the risk by taking short positions in the futures market. The non-commercials, sometimes called speculators, have no innate position in the physical commodity, and seek to earn a profit in the futures market by taking long or short positions to take advantage of what they view as favorable prices.

Since the COT reports only include the commodities that are traded on four American exchanges (NYMEX, NYBOT, CBOT, and CME), we exclude Cocoa futures from ICE London and Crude oil Brent futures from ICE Europe. In this section, the data sample include 23 commodities and the sample period is from April 1995 to December 2018. Then we merge the COT reports with the data of futures contracts for individual commodities.

5.2 Baseline model

In the previous section, we have shown that there is a negative relation between the option-to-futures volume ratio and futures returns in the next week. The results indicate that the informed traders tend to trade in commodity option markets instead of futures market when hear bad news. Since the main participants in commodity markets are commercials and non-commercials (speculators), it is meaningful to investigate the behaviors of these two type traders.

[Kang et al. \(2017\)](#) also use weekly data (futures returns are constructed as Tuesday-Tuesday) to study the dynamic interaction between the net positions and risk premiums in commodity futures markets. For the short-term horizon (weekly level), the position changes are mainly driven by the liquidity demands of non-commercial traders. Also, we calculate the weekly return for each futures contract with different maturity for each commodity. However, [Kang et al. \(2017\)](#) compute the weekly excess return using the front-month contract. Since the open interest of COT reports is the total of all futures and option contracts for each commodity, our data sample is more consistent with the data in the COT reports.

We use the main model from [Kang et al. \(2017\)](#) as our baseline model. In their paper, they construct three variables to characterize the positions and trading behavior of participants in futures markets: hedging pressure (HP), net trading (Q), and the propensity to trade (PT).

Hedging pressure (HP) is defined as the number of contracts that the commercial traders are short minus the number of contracts that are long, divided by the total open interest. For commodity i in week t :

$$HP_{i,t} = \frac{\text{commercial netshort positions}_{i,t}}{OI_{i,t}}$$

$\overline{HP}_{i,t}$ is calculated as trailing 52-week moving average of the net short positions of commercials from week $t - 51$ to week t scaled by the open interest in week t . [Kang et al. \(2017\)](#)

show that $\overline{HP}_{i,t}$ captures sources of variation in risk premiums and significantly predicts expected returns.

For commercials and non-commercials, the net trading measure (Q) is defined as the net purchase of futures contracts, calculated as the change in their long position for commodity i from week $t - 1$ to week t , normalized by the open interest at the beginning of the week:

$$Q_{i,t} = \frac{\text{netlong position}_{i,t} - \text{netlong position}_{i,t-1}}{OI_{i,t-1}}$$

Column 1 in table 7 shows the results of the baseline model for commercials and confirms the findings by Kang et al. (2017). The commodities that are bought by the commercials in week t earn significant higher returns in week $t + 1$ than the commodities sold by them. The coefficient of \overline{HP} is also positive and similar with Kang et al. (2017), although not statistical significant. The results of the baseline model for non-commercials are in column 3 of table 7. The results in column 3 also replicate the results from Kang et al. (2017). The variable \overline{HP} is significant to predict the risk premium of commodity in the multivariate regression.

One concern is that whether the relationship between O/F and the expected returns still hold in this baseline model. Table 7 helps to address this concern. In the regressions for commercials and non-commercials in columns 2 and 4, the coefficients of $\log(O/F)$ remain significant at 1% level (t -statistics = -2.614 and -3.142). These estimates indicate strong support for the findings in the previous section.

5.3 Liquidity supply and demand in commodity options market

An intuitive extension of Kang et al. (2017) is to explore the liquidity supply and demand in commodity options market. Our empirical strategy in this section parallels the empirical method in Kang et al. (2017) for commodity futures market. In commodity options market, we construct net trading measure (NT) as the net purchase of options contracts for commercials and non-commercials, calculated as the change in their net long position in options

contracts for commodity i from week $t - 1$ to week t , normalized by the open interest at the beginning of the week:

$$NT_{i,t} = \frac{\text{netlong position}_{i,t} - \text{netlong position}_{i,t-1}}{OI_{i,t-1}}$$

where $OI_{i,t-1}$ is the total open interest (including futures and options) at week $t - 1$.

We first explore the relationship between the net trading measure (NT) in options and contemporaneous or past returns. The average first-order autocorrelation of weekly time-series NT of all 23 commodity futures markets for commercials and non-commercials are only -0.056 and -0.036. Based on this low autocorrelation of time series NT , we can be confident to employ the Fama-MacBeth regression. Table 8 presents the time series average of the slope coefficients and the corresponding t -statistics. For both commercials and non-commercials, the net trading measure (NT) is significantly correlated to the contemporaneous and lagged commodity futures returns. However, the correlations between net trading measure (NT) in options with returns have opposite signs for commercials (negative) and non-commercials (positive). Actually, the commercials are contrarians and non-commercials are momentum traders in commodity options market. These results are consistent with the findings in [Kang et al. \(2017\)](#) in commodity futures market, as well as the results in [Rouwenhorst and Tang \(2012\)](#).

Motivated by the models in [Campbell et al. \(1993\)](#), [Grossman and Miller \(1988\)](#), [Kaniel et al. \(2008\)](#) and [Kang et al. \(2017\)](#), the market makers typically trade against price trends and are compensated for providing liquidity by the price reversal subsequently. To determine the direction of liquidity provision, we conduct the analysis about the impact of net trading measure (NT) in options on the subsequent commodity futures returns. We run the predictive Fama-MacBeth regressions of cumulative commodity futures returns from week t to weeks $t + 1$, $t + 2$, and $t + 3$ on the net trading measure (NT) in options with the control

variables to capture variation in expected futures returns:

$$RET_i^{(t,t+j)} = \alpha_i + \beta_1 NT_{i,t} + \beta_2 CAR_{i,t} + \beta_3 r_{i,t} + \beta_4 Q_{i,t} + \beta_5 \overline{HP}_{i,t} + \epsilon_{i,t+j}, \quad j = 1, 2, 3$$

where $RET_i^{(t,t+j)}$ is the cumulative return of commodity i from week t to $t + j$. $CAR_{i,t}$ is the log of basis for commodity i in week t , $\overline{HP}_{i,t}$ is the moving average of hedging pressure for commodity i in week t .

From table 9, we find that the commodities bought by the commercials in week t has significant higher cumulative returns in the subsequent three weeks than the commodities sold by the commercials after controlling other variables. However, from table 10, the commodities bought by the non-commercials in week t has significant lower cumulative returns in the subsequent three weeks than the commodities sold by the non-commercials.

One concern is that the commercials have the private information so the prices of commodities they buy have higher chance to increase in the subsequent time periods. The commercials have the information advantage in the underlying physical commodities markets that is about the fundamentals in the commodity markets, which the non-commercials may not be able to observe. If the commercial traders have the private information in commodity market, the price of commodities purchased by the commercials should simultaneously increase (Kang et al., 2017). However, in table 8, the commercials are buying losers and sell winner before the release of the COT report, which is consistent with the theory of liquidity provision.

Overall, we find the clear answer for the question which participant provide the liquidity in commodity options markets. The empirical results show that, in the commodity options market, the commercials buy losers, sell winners, employ the contrarian strategy and provide the liquidity to satisfy the trading demand of non-commercial traders.

6 Robustness checks

6.1 Before and after the start of financialization

In the most recent decade, commodity index traders have become a significant big player in the commodity market. This fundamental change is called the financialization of commodity markets. Referring to figure 3, there is a sharp decline of O/F since year 2005, which confirms the existence of financialization in commodity markets. Because commodity index traders mainly invest in the futures market, O/F fell sharply since year 2005. So it has great importance to investigate whether the empirical results would change before and after the start of financialization in commodity market. We divide the whole sample interval into two sub-periods. Sub-period 1 include the time period before year 2005 (including 2005); sub-period 2 is the time period after year 2005.

First, we employ time-series tests for these two sub-periods. The baseline model is the same as that in Section 3.2. The results for the time-series tests are in table B.1 and table B.2. For sub-period 1, the “1-8” and “(1+2)-(7+8)” columns show positive significant alpha for one, two, three factor models. Column 1 also presents positive significant alpha (t -statistics = 2.277, 2.451, 2.331) for all three models. For sub-period 2, all the alphas are positive significant in column 1 and ”1-8” for all the models. In summary, the results in two sub-periods pass the time-series tests.

Next, the cross-sectional tests are conducted for both sub-periods as in Section 3.3. From table B.3, the coefficients of O/F are negative significant in both models for the two sub-periods.

6.2 Commodity sector analysis

Do our results hold in different sectors, or are they mainly driven by one sector of commodities that have high expected returns with low O/F or low expected returns with high O/F ? We sort our sample commodities into 4 sectors: Agriculture, Energy, Livestock, and Metals. For

each sector, the cross-sectional tests are employed. In table B.4, we report the results for each sector. The predictive power of O/F still exists and negatively significant in Agriculture, Energy, and Livestock sectors. An interesting finding is that the impact of CAR , MOM and AMI is different from table 5, which is based on the whole sample. CAR and MOM have opposite significant impact in predicting prices, then it is not surprised that these two variables are not significant in the cross-sectional results based on the whole sample.

6.3 Monthly analysis

In the previous sections of our paper, we use the weekly data to do the analysis. In the literature, many papers use the monthly data such as Yang (2013), Bakshi et al. (2017), and Hong and Yogo (2012). An intuitive question is to ask whether the empirical results only hold in the weekly data. In this section, we assess whether we can get similar results in monthly data.

The results of monthly analysis are reported in table B.5. The coefficient of O/F remains positively significant after controlling different variables, which indicates O/F has good predictive power even on a longer long time period.

6.4 Alternative measure $\Delta O/F$

The last robustness check is to utilize an alternative measure of O/F . Similar to the stock market, one potential concern with our empirical results is that some commodities could have consistently higher O/F and lower average returns for some reasons (Johnson and So, 2012). To address this concern, we construct an alternative measure $\Delta O/F$ as the change in O/F relative to a rolling average of past O/F in prior 8 weeks for each commodity. $\Delta O/F$ is defined as:

$$\Delta O/F_{i,t} = \frac{O/F_{i,t} - \overline{O/F}_i}{\overline{O/F}_i}$$

where $\overline{O/F}_i$ is the average $O/F_{i,t}$ for commodity i over the prior 8 weeks.

The results in table [B.6](#) show that the coefficient estimates of $\Delta O/F$ are negative and significant, which is consistent with our expectation. We can address the concern that some commodities have consistently high O/F with low average returns or low O/F with high average returns.

7 Conclusion

In this paper, we examine the information content in commodity futures and options volume. In the previous literature, commodity options markets have received much less attention than commodity futures markets. However, the trading activities in options markets can have great effect on the underlying futures markets. We are the first to study the option-to-futures volume ratio in an empirical asset pricing framework.

After the time-series tests and cross-sectional tests, we confirm the return predictability of O/F . Our results are robust across a variety of specifications. Our paper makes a unique contribution to confirm WASDE announcement effect. Comparing with the predictive ability of the information contained in WASDE report, O/F has relatively long-lived predictive power, which suggests that it takes multiple weeks for the information in O/F to become fully reflected in futures prices. In the analysis of COT reports, we find that the non-commercial traders in commodity options markets demand short-term liquidity from the commercial traders. Non-commercials pay a premium by buying the underperformance commodities and sell outperformance commodities.

Our work suggests many areas of further research. First, given the data of commodity options, an interesting topic is to explore the determinants of volatility in commodity futures prices since the investors often refer to implied volatility to make investment decisions on options market. Second, the volume differences across calls and puts could be examined to predict commodity futures returns skewness, which can be a good complement to [Fernandez-Perez et al. \(2018\)](#). Finally, a critically important topic is to find more empirical evidence

to explain why there is a negative and significant relationship between O/F and expected futures returns. These and other issues are left for future research.

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


Figure 1: Procedure to select sample




Figure 2: Options and futures volume by year from 1994 to 2018




Figure 3: Average annual value of O/F between 1994 to 2018




Figure 4: Average annual value of O/F excluding gasoline futures and options between 1994 to 2018




Figure 5: Cross-sectional of average futures return and average value of O/F .

Table 1: Summary statistics of commodity futures for every individual commodity in the sample.

The sample include the average weekly close quotes of individual futures contract of 25 commodities from March 1994 to December 2018. The column N is the number of weekly observations available for a commodity. The column O/F reports the historical average weekly ratio of options-to-futures trading volumes. The columns $E[R](\%)$ and $\sigma[R]$ are the historical average and standard deviation of weekly futures excess returns of individual commodities with different maturities.

Sector	Commodity	Symbol	N	O/F	$E[R](\%)$	$\sigma[R]$	Sharpe ratio
Agriculture	Soybean oil	BO	1641	0.091	-0.131	0.033	-4.021
	Corn	C	988	0.300	-0.125	0.037	-3.354
	Cocoa (ICE-US)	CC	1035	0.154	-0.024	0.039	-0.622
	Cotton	CT	1015	0.400	-0.082	0.035	-2.323
	Orange juice	JO	1232	0.291	-0.080	0.044	-1.825
	Coffee	KC	1032	0.415	-0.121	0.051	-2.397
	Lumber	LB	1196	0.074	-0.211	0.042	-5.033
	Oats	O	908	0.075	0.023	0.046	0.495
	Cocoa (ICE-London)	QC	777	0.156	-0.193	0.036	-5.310
	Rough rice	RR	1215	0.085	-0.220	0.035	-6.339
	Soybeans	S	1414	0.341	-0.011	0.032	-0.330
	Sugar	SB	840	0.249	-0.221	0.043	-5.112
	Soybean meal	SM	1633	0.106	0.112	0.036	3.076
	Wheat	W	988	0.255	-0.223	0.041	-5.499
Energy	Crude oil (WTI)	CL	2548	0.196	0.025	0.047	0.532
	Crude oil (Brent)	CO	1958	0.057	0.249	0.043	5.843
	Heating oil	HO	2415	0.029	0.077	0.044	1.740
	Natural gas	NG	2460	0.080	-0.411	0.062	-6.608
	Gasoline	XB	1193	0.013	-0.071	0.047	-1.512
Livestock	Feeder cattle	FC	1687	0.132	0.031	0.020	1.550
	Live cattle	LC	1176	0.199	0.040	0.021	1.856
	Lean hogs	LH	1504	0.154	-0.063	0.036	-1.769
Metals	Gold	GC	1233	0.135	0.032	0.023	1.425
	Copper	HG	1840	0.008	0.045	0.034	1.307
	Silver	SI	1032	0.090	0.052	0.039	1.332

Table 2: Descriptive statistics of O/F by year.

This table provides the sample size information and descriptive of $O/F_{i,t,T}$, where $O/F_{i,t,T}$ is the ratio of option volume to futures volume of the contract with maturity T of commodity i in each week t from March 1994 to December 2018. The column Commodities is the number of commodities that appear in each year. The column Contracts is the total number of contracts of all commodities in each year. The column N is the total number of weekly observations of all commodities available in a year. The last 5 columns are the mean, 25th percentile, median, 75th percentile and skewness of $O/F_{i,t,T}$ for each year.

Year	Commodities	Contracts	N	MEAN	P25	MEDIAN	P75	SKEW
1994	23	139	988	0.207	0.058	0.107	0.209	9.768
1995	24	193	1434	0.276	0.066	0.136	0.256	15.193
1996	24	176	1295	0.259	0.083	0.163	0.303	7.938
1997	24	191	1376	0.254	0.078	0.165	0.282	14.479
1998	24	197	1448	0.248	0.079	0.175	0.298	5.561
1999	24	199	1484	0.251	0.080	0.158	0.267	13.686
2000	24	197	1432	0.326	0.066	0.149	0.266	9.644
2001	23	173	1249	0.291	0.073	0.168	0.301	6.810
2002	24	188	1332	0.318	0.057	0.152	0.310	13.694
2003	24	196	1393	0.309	0.055	0.139	0.278	13.410
2004	24	191	1334	0.286	0.061	0.166	0.339	8.571
2005	24	180	1210	0.312	0.065	0.139	0.272	13.514
2006	25	195	1365	0.225	0.045	0.130	0.267	24.946
2007	25	197	1442	0.158	0.030	0.075	0.178	12.895
2008	25	208	1456	0.169	0.034	0.079	0.194	10.030
2009	25	209	1428	0.158	0.021	0.064	0.165	19.023
2010	25	214	1472	0.138	0.020	0.067	0.175	5.615
2011	25	213	1511	0.158	0.020	0.070	0.213	4.087
2012	25	202	1477	0.205	0.029	0.079	0.223	20.220
2013	25	211	1497	0.170	0.043	0.095	0.220	23.924
2014	25	211	1486	0.174	0.038	0.109	0.236	11.847
2015	25	213	1499	0.171	0.040	0.110	0.228	7.650
2016	25	206	1457	0.164	0.041	0.105	0.225	4.492
2017	25	207	1457	0.160	0.036	0.100	0.214	8.008
2018	25	195	1438	0.165	0.030	0.104	0.204	12.095
ALL	25	4281	34960	0.220	0.044	0.119	0.246	19.670

Table 3: Group characteristics sorted by O/F .

This table provides the characteristics of groups sort by O/F for all weekly observations. The date range of the sample is from March 1994 to December 2018. We divide the sample data into 8 groups with the same number of commodity-weeks data. Group 1 is with the lowest value of O/F . Group 8 has the highest value of O/F . The column Commodities and Contracts are the total number of commodities and contracts in each group. VLC and VLP are the average call and put contracts trading volume in each group. OPVOL and FVOL are the average options and futures trading volume in each group. The column O/F is historical average value of O/F for each group. r_{t+1} is the weekly average return of a group in the next week after the given week t .

Group	Commodities	Contracts	VLC	VLP	OPVOL	FPVOL	O/F	r_{t+1}
1	21	1147	660.648	571.822	1232.470	158066.472	0.008	0.054
2	23	1666	2443.777	2209.608	4653.385	147130.722	0.031	0.015
3	25	1852	4710.775	4302.299	9013.074	150986.305	0.060	-0.013
4	25	2022	8005.445	7323.093	15328.538	156346.984	0.097	-0.112
5	25	2097	14934.845	14631.800	29566.645	204271.365	0.145	0.018
6	25	1985	20693.111	19690.694	40383.805	195293.307	0.207	-0.038
7	25	1791	25686.789	23791.294	49478.082	165071.331	0.303	-0.101
8	24	1369	22782.214	19535.015	42317.229	77647.619	0.909	-0.220

Table 4: Time-series tests results of groups sorted by O/F

The groups are sorted by $O/F_{i,t}$, where $O/F_{i,t}$ is the ratio of option volume to futures volume of commodity i in week t . Group 1 has the lowest value of O/F , where group 8 is with highest O/F . The return of each group is the weekly return in week $t + 1$. We include three contemporaneous risk factors of week $t + 1$ in the regressions: AVG , $CARRY$, MOM . The three regressions have part or full of these three risk factors. The t -statistics are shown in parenthesis.

	1 (Low)	2	3	4	5	6	7	8 (High)	1-8	(1+2)-(7+8)
Commodity CAPM										
Alpha	0.001 (2.732)	-0.0002 (-0.343)	0.0004 (0.702)	-0.001 (-1.438)	-0.001 (-1.063)	0.0003 (0.540)	-0.0002 (-0.361)	-0.001 (-2.275)	0.003 (3.144)	0.003 (2.244)
AVG	1.137 (42.188)	0.862 (28.158)	0.831 (26.196)	0.739 (24.978)	0.728 (22.547)	0.905 (27.928)	0.951 (29.173)	0.875 (26.336)	0.263 (5.530)	0.173 (2.583)
R^2	0.580	0.381	0.347	0.326	0.283	0.377	0.398	0.350	0.022	0.004
Commodity AVG and $CARRY$										
Alpha	0.001 (2.809)	-0.0001 (-0.170)	0.001 (0.820)	-0.001 (-1.542)	-0.001 (-1.061)	0.0003 (0.544)	-0.0003 (-0.400)	-0.001 (-2.246)	0.003 (3.164)	0.003 (2.360)
AVG	1.141 (42.228)	0.869 (28.446)	0.835 (26.286)	0.735 (24.812)	0.728 (22.473)	0.905 (27.913)	0.951 (29.116)	0.876 (26.299)	0.264 (5.546)	0.182 (2.713)
$CARRY$	-0.036 (-2.043)	-0.055 (-2.794)	-0.014 (-0.666)	0.030 (1.599)	-0.007 (-0.332)	-0.030 (-1.423)	-0.006 (-0.291)	-0.014 (-0.633)	-0.022 (-0.716)	-0.071 (-1.637)
R^2	0.581	0.386	0.349	0.326	0.282	0.377	0.397	0.349	0.022	0.006
Commodity AVG , $CARRY$ and MOM										
Alpha	0.002 (2.869)	-0.0001 (-0.164)	0.0005 (0.742)	-0.001 (-1.647)	-0.001 (-1.106)	0.0004 (0.661)	-0.0002 (-0.377)	-0.002 (-2.341)	0.003 (3.267)	0.003 (2.423)
AVG	1.138 (41.996)	0.869 (28.331)	0.838 (26.334)	0.740 (24.925)	0.731 (22.471)	0.899 (27.680)	0.950 (28.975)	0.881 (26.388)	0.256 (5.371)	0.175 (2.602)
$CARRY$	-0.033 (-1.862)	-0.055 (-2.751)	-0.018 (-0.861)	0.025 (1.315)	-0.009 (-0.450)	-0.023 (-1.111)	-0.005 (-0.231)	-0.019 (-0.876)	-0.014 (-0.444)	-0.063 (-1.454)
MOM	-0.021 (-1.220)	-0.002 (-0.128)	0.030 (1.500)	0.038 (2.033)	0.018 (0.901)	-0.046 (-2.257)	-0.009 (-0.434)	0.039 (1.859)	-0.059 (-1.994)	-0.053 (-1.259)
R^2	0.581	0.386	0.350	0.328	0.281	0.379	0.397	0.351	0.024	0.006

Table 5: Cross-sectional tests results

This table presents Fama-MacBeth regression results from regressing $RET(1)$ on risk factors. $RET(1)$ is the dependent variable indicates the return of commodity i in week $t + 1$ after observing O/F at the end of week t . CAR equals the basis of commodity i at the end of week t . MOM is the cumulative returns measures over the past 8 weeks and adjusted by market return. AMI is the Amihud illiquidity of commodity i in week t . $RET(0)$ is the contemporaneous return of commodity i in week t . $FVOL$ equals the futures volume of commodity i in week t . $OPVOL$ equals the options volume of commodity i in week t . The t -statistics are shown in parenthesis. The notations ***, **, * indicate the coefficient is significant at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.

<i>Fama-MacBeth regressions of $RET(1)$</i>							
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
<i>CAR</i>	-0.982 (-0.977)	-0.915 (-0.894)	-0.582 (-0.556)	-0.933 (-0.890)	-0.530 (-0.522)	-0.410 (-0.396)	-0.479 (-0.424)
<i>MOM</i>	0.299 (0.637)	0.363 (0.758)	0.322 (0.672)	0.360 (0.749)	0.293 (0.624)	0.371 (0.779)	0.415 (0.789)
<i>AMI</i>		2.339 (0.416)	7.077 (0.883)	0.630 (0.089)		1.729 (0.299)	2.818 (0.410)
$\log(FVOL)$			0.027 (1.161)				
$\log(OPVOL)$				-0.016 (-1.189)			
$\log(O/F)$					-0.040** (-2.161)	-0.049** (-2.542)	-0.067*** (-3.307)
<i>RET(0)</i>							1.003 (0.866)
Constant	0.952 (0.937)	0.882 (0.854)	0.280 (0.257)	1.054 (0.993)	0.406 (0.395)	0.267 (0.255)	0.307 (0.268)
Observations	27,024	27,024	27,024	27,024	27,024	27,024	25,729
R ²	0.268	0.313	0.344	0.323	0.273	0.320	0.387

Table 6: Results for post-announcement cumulative returns analysis

This table presents the results about the predictive power of O/F on the cumulative returns after the announcement. ΔES is the change of forecast in ending stock from last month to current month, scaled by the forecast in the last month. pre-CUM denotes cumulative return over the pre-announcement window (days -5 to -1); abs(pre-CUM) denotes absolute value of cumulative return over the pre-announcement window (days -5 to -1). CAR and AMI are the basis and measure for illiquidity for commodity over the pre-announcement window. The standard errors are clustered (by time). The t -statistics are shown in parentheses. The notations ***, **, * indicate the coefficient is significant at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.

<i>Dep. variable:</i>	CUM(+0,+5)	CUM(+0,+10)	CUM(+0,+15)	CUM(+0,+20)
ΔES	-3.992*** (-4.007)	0.122 (1.093)	0.039 (0.399)	0.021 (0.267)
log(O/F)	-0.280*** (-3.276)	-0.040*** (-3.171)	-0.043*** (-3.822)	-0.036*** (-3.778)
pre-CUM	0.080** (2.090)	0.010* (1.814)	0.009* (1.693)	0.007 (1.566)
abs(pre-CUM)	-0.080 (-1.515)	-0.007 (-0.944)	-0.003 (-0.386)	-0.004 (-0.800)
CAR	7.122* (1.938)	0.707 (1.504)	1.006** (2.225)	0.578* (1.652)
AMI	-204.298 (-0.346)	108.648 (1.376)	84.806* (1.862)	38.321 (0.645)
Constant	-7.632** (-2.032)	-0.798* (-1.649)	-1.102** (-2.375)	-0.651* (-1.810)
Observations	2,190	2,090	2,090	2,090
R ²	0.026	0.013	0.017	0.014

Table 7: Results for Commercials and Non-Commercials

This table presents Fama-MacBeth regression results from regressing $RET(1)$ on risk factors for commercials and non-commercials. $RET(1)$ is the dependent variable indicates the return of commodity i in week $t + 1$ after observing O/F at the week t . $RET(0)$ is the return of commodity i in week t . CAR equals the basis of commodity i at the end of week t . Q is the net trading measure of commercials and non-commercials for commodity i in week t . \overline{HP} is the smoothed hedging pressure for commodity i in week t . The t -statistics are shown in parenthesis. The notations ***, **, * indicate the coefficient is significant at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.

<i>Fama-MacBeth regressions of $RET(1)$</i>				
	Commercials		Non-Commercials	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
CAR	-0.737 (-0.625)	-0.382 (-0.311)	-0.977 (-0.821)	-0.696 (-0.567)
$RET(0)$	3.053** (2.185)	2.209 (1.514)	2.883** (2.095)	2.134 (1.503)
Q	5.460*** (5.048)	4.610*** (3.916)	-6.009*** (-5.134)	-5.297*** (-4.217)
\overline{HP}	0.280 (1.443)	0.281 (1.400)	0.381* (1.940)	0.389* (1.935)
$\log(O/F)$		-0.076*** (-2.614)		-0.085*** (-3.142)
Constant	0.694 (0.582)	0.170 (0.136)	0.913 (0.758)	0.444 (0.356)
Observations	21,548	21,548	21,548	21,548
R^2	0.294	0.310	0.291	0.306

Table 8: Relationship of NT with contemporaneous and lagged returns

This table presents the Fama-MacBeth regression results from regressing $NT(0)$ on risk factors for commercials. $RET(0)$ is the contemporaneous return of commodity i in week t . $RET(-1)$ is one lag return of commodity i in week $t - 1$. $NT(-1)$ is one lag net trading measure (NT) of commodity i in week $t - 1$. The t -statistics are shown in parenthesis. The notations ***, **, * indicate the coefficient is significant at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.

<i>Dependent Variable: NT(0)</i>				
	Commercial		Non-Commercial	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
$RET(0)$	-0.095*** (-32.235)		0.067*** (26.070)	
$RET(-1)$		-0.007** (-2.454)		0.013*** (4.800)
$NT(-1)$		-0.003 (-0.205)		0.023* (1.680)
Constant	-0.0001** (-2.000)	-0.0001 (-1.426)	0.0001** (2.034)	0.0001* (1.671)
Observations	22,416	22,396	22,416	22,396
R^2	0.218	0.170	0.142	0.149

Table 9: Return predictability of NT for Commercials

This table presents the Fama-MacBeth regression results from regressing $RET(1)$ on risk factors for commercials. $RET(1)$ is the dependent variable indicates the return of commodity i in week $t + 1$. The control variables are CAR , $RET(0)$, \overline{HP} , and Q . The t -statistics are shown in parenthesis. The notations ***, **, * indicate the coefficient is significant at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.

<i>Return predictability for Commercials</i>			
	RET(+0,+1)	RET(+0,+2)	RET(+0,+3)
CAR	-0.828 (-0.663)	-2.250 (-1.248)	-1.522 (-0.690)
$RET(0)$	3.492** (2.280)	6.608*** (3.062)	8.843*** (3.327)
\overline{HP}	0.252 (1.244)	0.499* (1.701)	0.876** (2.391)
Q	5.730*** (4.775)	8.604*** (4.815)	10.226*** (4.699)
NT	9.815* (1.647)	23.416*** (2.902)	23.863** (2.361)
Constant	0.801 (0.634)	2.193 (1.202)	1.392 (0.624)
Observations	21,548	21,528	21,507
R^2	0.317	0.311	0.313

Table 10: Return predictability of NT for Non-Commercials

This table presents the Fama-MacBeth regression results from regressing $RET(1)$ on risk factors for non-commercials. $RET(1)$ is the dependent variable indicates the return of commodity i in week $t + 1$ after observing O/F at the week t . The control variables are CAR , $RET(0)$, Q and \overline{HP} . The t -statistics are shown in parenthesis. The notations ***, **, * indicate the coefficient is significant at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.

<i>Return predictability for Non-Commercials</i>			
	RET(+0,+1)	RET(+0,+2)	RET(+0,+3)
CAR	-1.002 (-0.801)	-2.709 (-1.485)	-2.575 (-1.148)
$RET(0)$	3.797** (2.457)	6.062*** (2.855)	8.054*** (3.121)
\overline{HP}	0.370* (1.782)	0.635** (2.170)	0.871** (2.345)
Q	-6.403*** (-4.946)	-9.279*** (-4.861)	-9.930*** (-4.299)
NT	-12.113** (-2.142)	-26.478*** (-3.330)	-29.717*** (-3.060)
Constant	0.949 (0.750)	2.623 (1.420)	2.440 (1.074)
Observations	21,548	21,528	21,507
R^2	0.313	0.306	0.304

Appendices

A Model for ending stocks and futures prices

In the rational storage model, theoretically, the amount of crop to be stored to the following period shall be compensated by the carry in the futures markets:

$$E_t[p_T(z_T + c_T)] - p_t = g(c_T|c_t)$$

where p_T is the harvest price of crop in year T , p_t is the spot price, z_T and c_T are the new production and remaining carryout at harvest, the carryout from the last marketing year is c_t . Denote the cost of carry, $g(c_T|c_t)$, as the cost of storing c_T amount of crop from time t to the harvest time, T , conditional on the initial carryout available, c_t .

If we assume that there is the absence of a risk premium:

$$E_t[p_T(z_T + c_T)] = f_{t,T}$$

Since the price function p_T is decreasing in c_T , there is a negative relationship between c_T and $f_{t,T}$.

B Robustness Checks

Table B.1: Time-series test for sub-period 1: Factor regression results of groups sorted by O/F

The groups are sorted by $O/F_{i,t}$, where $O/F_{i,t}$ is the ratio of option volume to futures volume of commodity i in week t . Group 1 has the lowest value of O/F , where group 8 is with highest O/F . The return of each group is the weekly return in week $t + 1$. We include three contemporaneous risk factors in the regressions: AVG , $CARRY$, MOM . The three regressions have part or full of these three risk factors. The t -statistics are shown in parentheses.

	1 (Low)	2	3	4	5	6	7	8 (High)	1-8	(1+2)-(7+8)
Commodity CAPM										
Alpha	0.002 (2.277)	0.0003 (0.385)	-0.001 (-1.186)	0.0001 (0.097)	-0.002 (-2.212)	-0.0003 (-0.304)	-0.001 (-1.304)	-0.002 (-1.656)	0.003 (2.497)	0.005 (2.645)
AVG	1.011 (21.835)	0.749 (15.294)	0.760 (13.693)	0.726 (14.305)	0.792 (14.528)	0.929 (15.485)	0.926 (15.593)	0.905 (15.353)	0.106 (1.301)	-0.071 (-0.631)
R^2	0.438	0.276	0.234	0.250	0.256	0.281	0.284	0.278	0.001	-0.001
Commodity AVG and $CARRY$										
Alpha	0.002 (2.451)	0.0005 (0.582)	-0.001 (-0.939)	-0.00005 (-0.057)	-0.002 (-2.107)	-0.0002 (-0.247)	-0.001 (-1.363)	-0.002 (-1.600)	0.004 (2.550)	0.005 (2.801)
AVG	1.027 (22.026)	0.765 (15.527)	0.781 (13.986)	0.711 (13.916)	0.803 (14.585)	0.938 (15.511)	0.925 (15.428)	0.912 (15.275)	0.115 (1.400)	-0.045 (-0.395)
$CARRY$	-0.066 (-2.676)	-0.039 (-1.509)	-0.058 (-1.968)	0.040 (1.477)	-0.051 (-1.777)	-0.057 (-1.796)	-0.004 (-0.134)	-0.022 (-0.686)	-0.044 (-1.019)	-0.079 (-1.314)
R^2	0.443	0.282	0.242	0.250	0.257	0.282	0.283	0.277	0.001	0.0001
Commodity AVG , $CARRY$ and MOM										
Alpha	0.002 (2.331)	0.001 (0.635)	-0.001 (-0.974)	-0.0001 (-0.155)	-0.002 (-2.067)	-0.0001 (-0.106)	-0.001 (-1.299)	-0.002 (-1.582)	0.003 (2.468)	0.005 (2.731)
AVG	1.016 (21.712)	0.770 (15.527)	0.777 (13.820)	0.702 (13.661)	0.807 (14.551)	0.954 (15.737)	0.932 (15.444)	0.913 (15.191)	0.103 (1.243)	-0.059 (-0.516)
$CARRY$	-0.072 (-2.916)	-0.036 (-1.384)	-0.060 (-2.029)	0.034 (1.263)	-0.049 (-1.688)	-0.048 (-1.493)	-0.0002 (-0.005)	-0.021 (-0.652)	-0.051 (-1.176)	-0.087 (-1.440)
MOM	0.051 (2.331)	-0.024 (0.635)	0.019 (-0.974)	0.045 (-0.155)	-0.018 (-2.067)	-0.077 (-0.106)	-0.033 (-1.299)	-0.007 (-1.582)	0.058 (2.468)	0.067 (2.731)
R^2	0.446	0.282	0.241	0.252	0.257	0.287	0.283	0.276	0.002	0.0004

Table B.2: Time-series test for sub-period 2: Factor regression results of groups sorted by O/F

The groups are sorted by $O/F_{i,t}$, where $O/F_{i,t}$ is the ratio of option volume to futures volume of commodity i in week t . Group 1 has the lowest value of O/F , where group 8 is with highest O/F . The return of each group is the weekly return in week $t + 1$. We include three contemporaneous risk factors in the regressions: AVG , $CARRY$, MOM . The three regressions have part or full of these three risk factors. The t -statistics are shown in parentheses.

	1 (Low)	2	3	4	5	6	7	8 (High)	1-8	(1+2)-(7+8)
Commodity CAPM										
Alpha	0.001 (1.764)	-0.001 (-0.670)	0.002 (2.309)	-0.002 (-2.098)	0.001 (0.577)	0.001 (1.149)	0.001 (0.943)	-0.001 (-1.588)	0.003 (2.070)	0.001 (0.704)
AVG	1.205 (36.863)	0.922 (23.295)	0.874 (23.101)	0.744 (20.542)	0.697 (17.435)	0.893 (24.565)	0.968 (25.926)	0.859 (21.857)	0.347 (5.973)	0.301 (3.625)
R^2	0.667	0.444	0.440	0.383	0.309	0.471	0.498	0.413	0.049	0.018
Commodity AVG and $CARRY$										
Alpha	0.001 (1.762)	-0.001 (-0.664)	0.002 (2.306)	-0.002 (-2.100)	0.0005 (0.573)	0.001 (1.148)	0.001 (0.943)	-0.001 (-1.586)	0.003 (2.068)	0.001 (0.707)
AVG	1.205 (36.837)	0.922 (23.364)	0.873 (23.122)	0.744 (20.535)	0.697 (17.444)	0.893 (24.547)	0.968 (25.907)	0.859 (21.842)	0.346 (5.969)	0.301 (3.625)
$CARRY$	0.006 (0.238)	-0.066 (-2.221)	0.043 (1.509)	0.020 (0.736)	0.040 (1.326)	-0.0003 (-0.010)	-0.004 (-0.136)	-0.007 (-0.239)	0.013 (0.296)	-0.049 (-0.789)
R^2	0.667	0.448	0.441	0.383	0.310	0.470	0.497	0.412	0.047	0.017
Commodity AVG , $CARRY$ and MOM										
Alpha	0.001 (1.886)	-0.001 (-0.705)	0.002 (2.237)	-0.002 (-2.151)	0.0004 (0.515)	0.001 (1.181)	0.001 (0.917)	-0.001 (-1.699)	0.003 (2.221)	0.001 (0.795)
AVG	1.183 (35.523)	0.932 (23.054)	0.890 (23.037)	0.755 (20.357)	0.711 (17.382)	0.886 (23.768)	0.973 (25.422)	0.883 (22.044)	0.300 (5.091)	0.258 (3.052)
$CARRY$	0.015 (0.607)	-0.070 (-2.339)	0.036 (1.268)	0.016 (0.565)	0.034 (1.131)	0.003 (0.098)	-0.006 (-0.213)	-0.017 (-0.579)	0.032 (0.737)	-0.032 (-0.507)
MOM	-0.070 (-3.058)	0.031 (1.110)	0.051 (1.929)	0.035 (1.371)	0.044 (1.545)	-0.023 (-0.893)	0.017 (0.648)	0.078 (2.820)	-0.148 (-3.647)	-0.134 (-2.301)
R^2	0.671	0.448	0.444	0.384	0.311	0.470	0.497	0.418	0.064	0.023

Table B.3: Cross-sectional tests for sub-periods

This table presents Fama-MacBeth regression results from regressing $RET(1)$ on risk factors. $RET(1)$ is the dependent variable indicates the return of commodity i in week $t + 1$ after observing O/F at the end of week t . CAR equals the basis of commodity i at the end of week t . MOM is the cumulative returns measures over the past 8 weeks and adjusted by market return. AMI is the Amihud illiquidity of commodity i in week t . $RET(0)$ is the return of commodity i in week t . The t -statistics are shown in parentheses. The notations ***, **, * indicate the coefficient is significant at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.

<i>Fama-MacBeth regressions of $RET(1)$</i>				
	Sub-period 1		Sub-period 2	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
$\log(O/F)$	-0.057* (-1.855)	-0.091*** (-2.816)	-0.042* (-1.739)	-0.045* (-1.801)
CAR	-0.414 (-0.281)	0.125 (0.076)	-0.407 (-0.279)	-1.023 (-0.658)
MOM	0.404 (0.538)	0.284 (0.348)	0.342 (0.566)	0.533 (0.786)
AMI	1.125 (0.143)	2.428 (0.281)	2.274 (0.270)	3.169 (0.302)
$RET(0)$		0.837 (0.475)		1.152 (0.755)
Constant	0.330 (0.222)	-0.269 (-0.162)	0.211 (0.142)	0.826 (0.522)
Observations	12,346	11,852	14,678	13,877
R^2	0.263	0.338	0.358	0.419

Table B.4: Results of commodity sector analysis

This table presents ordinary least squares regression results from regressing $RET(1)$ on risk factors. $RET(1)$ is the dependent variable indicates the return of commodity i in week $t + 1$ after observing O/F at the end of week t . CAR equals the basis of commodity i at the end of week t . MOM is the cumulative returns measures over the past 8 weeks and adjusted by market return. AMI is the Amihud illiquidity of commodity i in week t . $RET(0)$ is the return of commodity i in week t . The standard errors are clustered (by time). The t -statistics are shown in parentheses. The notations ***, **, * indicate the coefficient is significant at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.

<i>Dependent variable: RET(1)</i>								
	Agriculture		Energy		Livestock		Metals	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
log(O/F)	-0.064* (-1.854)	-0.072** (-2.089)	-0.076* (-1.738)	-0.088* (-1.757)	-0.034** (-2.491)	-0.035*** (-5.834)	0.004 (0.481)	-0.001 (-0.128)
CAR	-0.153 (-0.135)	-0.299 (-0.259)	-0.023 (-0.008)	0.366 (0.135)	1.091*** (2.766)	1.089*** (3.353)	-14.465*** (-3.732)	-14.249*** (-2.971)
MOM	-0.786 (-1.572)	-0.812 (-1.512)	1.918*** (4.516)	1.809*** (3.904)	-0.146 (-0.369)	-0.215 (-0.589)	-0.636 (-0.348)	-0.409 (-0.239)
AMI	-0.491 (-0.906)	-1.666*** (-5.636)	-19.370*** (-8.252)	-19.587*** (-8.009)	-10.398 (-1.104)	-12.721 (-1.277)	-0.243** (-2.346)	-0.191 (-1.601)
RET(0)		0.151 (0.180)		0.395 (0.296)		3.383 (0.982)		3.550*** (9.651)
Constant	-0.067 (-0.059)	0.064 (0.056)	-0.245 (-0.082)	-0.671 (-0.241)	-1.145*** (-2.790)	-1.140*** (-3.264)	14.582*** (3.736)	14.337*** (2.971)
Observations	14,667	13,735	5,576	5,530	3,414	3,254	3,367	3,210
R ²	0.001	0.001	0.003	0.003	0.002	0.003	0.002	0.003

Table B.5: Results of monthly analysis

This table presents Fama-MacBeth regression results from regressing $RET(1)$ on risk factors. $RET(1)$ is the dependent variable indicates the return of commodity i in month $t + 1$ after observing O/F at the end of month t . CAR equals the basis of commodity i at the end of month t . MOM is the cumulative returns measures over the past 6 month and adjusted by market return. $AMIHUD$ is the Amihud illiquidity of commodity i in month t . $RET(0)$ is the return of commodity i in month t . The t -statistics are shown in parentheses. The notations ***, **, * indicate the coefficient is significant at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.

<i>Fama-MacBeth regressions of RET(1)</i>					
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
log(O/F)			-0.219** (-2.373)	-0.228** (-2.386)	-0.275*** (-2.835)
CAR	-5.059 (-1.199)	-5.773 (-1.256)	-6.448 (-1.530)	-7.388 (-1.587)	-6.680 (-1.384)
MOM	-0.036 (-0.662)	-0.043 (-0.766)	-0.035 (-0.649)	-0.043 (-0.770)	0.008 (0.138)
AMI		904.383 (0.132)		-1,424.941 (-0.199)	-1,934.951 (-0.258)
RET(0)					-0.001 (-0.058)
Constant	4.916 (1.145)	5.658 (1.214)	5.886 (1.366)	6.840 (1.441)	5.922 (1.209)
Observations	6,609	6,609	6,609	6,609	6,608
R ²	0.214	0.216	0.217	0.221	0.277

Table B.6: Results of ΔOF

This table presents Fama-MacBeth regression results from regressing $RET(1)$ on risk factors. $RET(1)$ is the dependent variable indicates the return of commodity i in week $t + 1$ after observing O/F at the end of week t . CAR equals the basis of commodity i at the end of week t . MOM is the cumulative returns measures over the past 8 weeks and adjusted by market return. AMI - HUD is the Amihud illiquidity of commodity i in week t . $RET(0)$ is the return of commodity i in week t . The t -statistics are shown in parentheses. The notations ***, **, * indicate the coefficient is significant at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.

<i>Fama-MacBeth regressions of $RET(1)$</i>			
	(1)	(2)	(3)
$\Delta O/F$		-0.074* (-1.841)	-0.092** (-2.147)
CAR	-0.915 (-0.894)	-0.819 (-0.768)	-0.627 (-0.541)
MOM	0.363 (0.758)	0.298 (0.607)	0.359 (0.667)
AMI	2.339 (0.416)	0.569 (0.096)	4.824 (0.699)
$RET(0)$			0.980 (0.813)
Constant	0.882 (0.854)	0.790 (0.733)	0.599 (0.511)
Observations	27,024	26,824	25,559
R^2	0.313	0.317	0.385