Location: 368A Heady Hall

Description: V. Bhaskar  (University of Texas at Austin)
"Marriage Market Equilibrium, Education and Ability"

Abstract: Using data on marital outcomes for individuals born close to the threshold for the 1973UK Raising of the School Leaving Age (RoSLA) reform, we estimate a equilibrium marriage market model where individuals differ not only in educational qualifications but also in unobserved ability. Following Choo and Siow (2006) the estimated model uses a transferable utility matching framework with random preferences over partner types. We show that accounting for unobserved ability is central for fitting the stylized marriage market responses to the reform. The findings indicate positive marital “ability premia” for both men and women, but no premia for holding a basic academic qualification. We further find that, through its general equilibrium effects, the reform systematically affected the marriage probabilities also of many individuals who were not directly affected in terms of their own educational choices and outcomes.

Contact Person: Joydeep Bhattacharya