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Publications

Publication Details

Quality certification standards in competitive markets: When consumers and producers (dis)agree

Author(s):   Harvey E. Lapan, GianCarlo Moschini

Economics Letters, Forthcoming

Abstract:
A quality certification standard in a competitive setting can improve welfare but may affect consumers and producers differently. In a competitive model with quality preferences of the vertical product differentiation type, we find that producers prefer a higher (lower) quality standard than consumers if individual demand functions are log-convex (log-concave).

JEL Classification:  D41, L15

Keywords:  Comparative statics, log-concavity, minimum quality standards, quality certification, vertical product differentiation