Topics: Econ 521, Spring 2007
SECTION ONE: DERIVED DEMAND FOR FACTORS
I. Production theory: Primal
A. Single input
·
Output elasticity
·
Scale elasticity
·
Stages of production and optimal demand
·
Short-run derived demand for labor
·
Cobb-Douglas as a first-order approximation to
an unknown production function
·
Relationship between marginal and average
products
·
Graphical representations of demand
·
Wages, Labor Productivity and Unit Labor Cost
·
Unit Labor Cost and trade flows
B. Multiple inputs
·
Convex Isoquants and firm optima
·
Concave production and the bordered Hessian
·
Elasticity of substitution
·
Output constant input demand
C. Empirical Strategies for primal estimation
·
Translog as a second order approximation to an
unknown production function
·
Application: Efficiency wage models: Solow and
Shapiro-Stiglitz
·
Huang
et al
·
Ackerloff-Yellen
·
Hibbs-Locking
·
Matched firm worker data
·
Hellerstein
et al on wages and marginal products
·
Moretti
on human capital externalities
D. Fundamental Law of Factor Demand
·
Derivation
·
Scale and Substitution elasticities
·
Hicks-Marshall Laws of Derived Demand
E. Digression on O-ring Production
·
Role of complementary skills on
o Matching
across worker skills
o Firm
size
o Returns
to skill
o Organization
of production by stages
II. Production Theory: Dual
A. Cost function
·
Derivation of input demands
·
Derived relationship between dual and primal
·
Translog cost function as a second order
approximation to an unknown cost function
·
Output constant demand
·
Elasticities of substitution
B. Empirical Strategies for dual estimation
- Adams on the impact of R&D investment on demand
for low and high skill workers
- Ollinger
et al on returns to scale and technology adoption
III. CES methods
- General
application to two input problems
- Relative wages as a function of
relative input quantities
- Example: returns to skill,
technology change and the baby boom
- Card
and Lemieux: allowing more elasticities of substitution
- Hanson
on illegal immigration and extension to three inputs
IV. Rules of thumb for designing studies
- Defining
the unit of observation
- Time
series vs cross section data
- Single
vs multiple equation methods
- Level
of aggregation
- Elasticity
of complementarity and inverse demands
- Primal
is for exogenous inputs, dual is for exogenous prices
- Instrumental
variables
- Measurement
errors
V. Nonlinear isocost
lines: choosing hours versus numbers of workers
- Policy
applications
- Labor
marker regulations and relative unemployment in OECD countries
- Trejo
on overtime premiums
- Autor
on exceptions to the “employment at will doctrine” and temporary
employment
SECTION TWO: EARNINGS INEQUALITY
I. Measures
- Gini
coefficients
- Standard
deviations or coefficient of variation
- 90-10
wage ratios
- earnings
function residual variances
II. Stylized facts for North America and Europe
- Inequality
has been increasing steadily in the U.S. since the 1980s
- Women
are gaining relative to men
- Minorities
gained relative to whites before the 1980s, but relative earnings for
minorities stabilized thereafter
- There
have been coincident increases in returns to schooling over that period
- There
have been rising returns to experience over that time frame
- Wage
inequality between women increased, as did wage inequality between men
- Inequality
for men started rising in the 1970s, for women in the 1980s
- Residual
inequality began to increase for both men and women in the 1970s
- Marriage
makes inequality worse if there is a positive correlation between earnings
of spouses
- Recessions
raise inequality, at least for men
- Young
college graduates have gained the most, especially in the 1990s
- There
are similar patterns in many industrialized nations, especially those that
do not have high minimum wages, strict employment protection, or strong
union concentration.
III.
Explanations
- Katz
and Murphy (1987), Murnane-Levy (1992) Econ 1 test
- Demand side-factors must have a
role except in the 1970s
- Use of concavity to test for
inverse relationship between relative supply and relative wages
- Shift-share
analysis
- Residual
inequality
- Earnings
variance decomposition
- Dunne
et al (2004): Inequality due to variance in IT investment, skill-biased
technical change
- Beaudry
and Green (2005): Inequality due to increase in capital deepening
IV. Discrimination
- Male-Female
wage gap
- Age
vs. Cohort Effects
- Earnings
decomposition into explained and unexplained gaps
- Role
of residual inequality (swimming upstream)
- Gaps
on exogenous vs endogenous factors
- Multiple
Markets and inappropriate measures of market discrimination
- Sorting
on qualifications: Affirmative Action
NONRANDOM
SORTING
I.
Sorting and Comparative advantage
- Plywood vs
Hardwood example
- Piece rates and sorting on
quality
- Sorting on effort
- Optimal piece rate
- When to offer or accept
piece rates vs salries
- Lazear
and Safelite: Sorting vs
Incentives
- Roy Model
- Implications of hierarchical
sorting on earnings distributions
II.
Enrepreneurship
- Lazear: the role of narrow
versus braod skills
- Hamilton: sorting versus human capital
versus compensating differentials
III. Statistical Tools for Nonrandom Sorting
- Heckman Selection
Corrections
- Missing Variables
- Implications of adding
endogenous regressors
- Control function estimators
-
Selection on observables
-
Selection on unobservables
- Twins
- Instrumental Variables
- Wald
Estimator
- Regression Discontinuity
- Fixed Effect Estimators
- Difference-In-Differences
- Propensity score matching
III. Experimental; Designs
- Reflexive designs
- Ex post matched comparisons
- Ex ante matched comparisons
- Difference-in-Differences
- Covariate controls
- Potential Problems
-
Ongoing Programs vs pilots
-
Randomization bias
-
Substitution bias
-
Dropout bias
-
Limited duration pilots vs long-term impacts
-
Hawthorne
effects
- JTPA and other training
programs
-
Experimental vs nonexperimental
estimates
-
Heckman and Smith (2004): Nonrandom selection into experiments
IV. Compensation
Issues
·
Lazear Models
·
Tournaments
·
Hawks
and Doves
·
Stock
Options
·
Executive
compensation and the principle-agent problem
·
Empirical
evidence on tournaments, Bognano (2001) and Audas et al (2004)
·
Empirical
evidence on CEO compensation, Bertrand and Mullainathan (2001, 2003)