"The Value of Secure Property Rights: Evidence from Global Fisheries," with Corbett Grainger University of Wisconsin-Madison, Wednesday, March 9th, 12:00 pm - 1:30 pm, 368A Heady Hall

Abstract: Property rights are often touted as a solution to common pool resource problems. But in practice the security of these property rights varies substantially. We contribute by exploring whether, how, and why property rights in security affects the values of assets they are meant to protect. In fisheries, the security of property rights underlying individual transferable quotas (ITQs) varies substantially across fisheries, though the implications of property rights security have not been carefully studied. We compile a unique dataset to examine the relationship between the security of property rights and the dividend price ratios for ITQs. We find compelling evidence that stronger property rights lead to lower dividend price ratios and higher asset values in fisheries. This pecuniary effect of property rights security informs the current policy debate on the design of property rights institutions for natural resources.

Grainger is an Assistant Professor in the AAE Department at University of Wisconsin – Madison. He is interested in studying the effects of regulations, property rights, and institutions with a focus on environmental policy and natural resources. His research interests include the distributional effects of environmental regulations and the effects of environmental policy on different demographic groups; and the design of institutions and property rights regimes, with an emphasis on environmental policy and the management of common pool resources.